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SUMMARY
This presentation has three parts. In Part one, I will provide a broad outline of various
approaches to the coordination of economic activity; this will allow us to clearly
distinguish between, on one hand, new forms of cooperation involving partnerships and
networks and, on the other hand, organisational forms such as holdings or cartels. In Part
two, I will situate the new forms of inter-organizational cooperation within what I think is
likely to be a new development model, but what others call the new spirit of capitalism. In
the Conclusion, I will identify the issues and challenges raised by these new forms of
economic coordination, and what organizations of the public economy and the social
economy will have to confront.
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1INTRODUCTION
In this short presentation, I would like to take a quick look at the timely theme of our
23rd Congress, entitled "Social Economy and Public Economy: New Forms of
Cooperation in an Era of Globalisation". With the advent of globalisation, the rediscovery
of civil society and the growing importance of the knowledge-based economy,
governments are increasingly relying on partnerships, strategic alliances, system linkages
and networking. It must be remembered that the theme of this congress refers less to the
dominant actors and neo-corporatism of the 1960s and 1970s, than to the new forms for
coordinating economic activity and relationships among private firms and between these
firms and other institutions, such as universities and unions. The existence of these
partnerships demonstrates that, irrespective of geographical location (1) there are limits to
competition, and (2) there is a need for cooperation in an economy that is more than ever
making use of public property (Streeck, 1992). That said, it appears that the role and
importance of partnerships vary considerably by enterprise, country and region, and this
prompts us to account for the variety of approaches adopted on a national level and by
various regional blocs. I believe that partnership will be a leading theme in the next few
years, since it is likely to characterize both the new world that is emerging (Castells,
1999) and the new "spirit of capitalism", a form of capitalism that is project-based
(Boltanski et Chiapello, 1999).
This presentation has three parts. In Part One, I will provide a broad outline of various
approaches to the coordination of economic activity; this will allow us to clearly
distinguish between, on one hand, new forms of cooperation involving partnerships and
networks and, on the other hand, organisational forms such as holdings or cartels. In Part
two, I will situate the new forms of inter-organizational cooperation within what I think is
likely to be a new development model, but what others call the new spirit of capitalism.
In the conclusion, I will identify the issues and challenges raised by these new forms of
economic coordination, and that organizations of the public economy and the social
economy will have to confront. Of course, at present there are more questions than
2answers, though the objective of this 23rd CIRIEC congress is, indeed, to explore
possible solutions during the discussions on each of the subtopics.
1. Partnership as a mechanism for coordinating economic activity
The new forms of cooperation between enterprises have many designations: partnership,
alliance, agreement, coalition, consortium, two-way agreement, interface, network,
relationship, joint venture, linkage, quasi-firm and others. Although the terms should not
be employed interchangeably, they generally refer to contractual agreements among
enterprises and organisations for the purposes of carrying out joint projects, even though
each party keeps its own identity and autonomy. These forms of cooperation are growing
in popularity. For example, according to a Columbia University study, joint ventures and
alliances grew by 20% in the second half of the 1980s, compared to 5% in the first half
(Wikstrom and Norman, 1994 : 41). The most successful American businesses were
involved in at least three agreements to cooperate with other enterprises and other
organizations, including universitites (Hage et Alter, 1997 : 96). An OECD symposium of
government officials and corporate managers reported that the profusion of collaborative
alliances and relationships among firms was regarded by some participants as one of the
most distinctive features of globalisation, and as a new and prominent trait in the
corporate strategies of several industries (OEDC, 1994 cited by Grant, 1997 : 329)
Partnership is associated with local development and the concept of proximity
(Dommergues, 1988; Storper, 1993; Piore et Sabel, 1984) in the same way that
globalisation goes hand in hand with the revival of local initiatives and decentralisation
(Castells,1999 : 422).
Hollingworth and Boyer (1997 : 12) have proposed a typology of mechanisms for
economic coordination. This typology reveals the structure of the new forms of
cooperation between enterprises and the new forms of governance. They plot the
coordinates of networks, joint ventures, strategic alliances, and other types of agreeement
between firms, on a quadrilateral in which the two intersecting axes represent,
respectively, the division of power and the motive for taking action; on one axis, the two
3extremities  are "the market" and "hierarchy"; on the other axis, the authors pit pursuit of
self-interest against the logic of reciprocity and obligation; in sum, the new types of
agreement are portrayed as hybrids. (see graph on p. 4 Forms of coordination and
governance). This graph provides a very good schematic representation for clearly
distinguishing the new forms of cooperation among enterprises (i) from those of the
vertically integrated firm where, like any hierarchy, there is an unequal distribution of
power, and between the traders (ii) from pure competition (without mutual obligations or
power relationships among traders). The diagram illustrates the difference between on
one hand holdings and conglomerates, and on the other hand new forms of cooperation
created by networks, alliances and joint ventures, etc.
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Hollingworth and Boyer, 1997 :
5The authors reveal that the new forms of cooperation consist of diverse mixtures of
pursuit of self-interest and social responsibility displayed by actors who are formally
independent and equal (even if the members of some networks do not have equal power
and influence). Competition is not eliminated. Rather, it co-habits, so to speak, with
forms of cooperation and agreement that emphasize reciprocity and the long term, even if
this means overstepping the purely contractual aspects of an agreement. Networks and
partnerships depend in part on the market and in part on medium and long-term
agreements. The State has a different type of coordinating mechanism: it sanctions and
regulates other coordinating mechanisms. It also supplies goods and services and sets up
government enterprises to serve the public interest; these enterprises encourage and
empower economic actors to cooperate by developing long-term agreements, and
discourages the type of economic rationality that avoids long-term considerations.
Each coordinating mechanism has its own rules, methodology, norms, ideology, strengths
and weaknesses. The market - as a coordinating mechanism - is better suited to dealing
with divisible private property than with public services, such as education, research and
innovation, transportation and infrastructure. While the market allows for decentralisation
and the independence of traders, it does not promote sustainable relationships or
agreements with a long-term horizon. On the other hand, mechanisms that rely on
hierarchy, such as large vertically integrated firms, can easily take on a longer-term
orientation, but this may involve sacrificing the flexibility and autonomy of their
personnel. Partnerships, such as certain types of joint ventures, provide the advantages of
mergers while avoiding its disadvantages. In such cases, the partners can benefit from
pooling their assets without losing their identity or their control over their own assets.
They can even form other partnerships to tap other products and markets. Indeed, in this
way partnerships allow for a contract-based growth that is different from internal growth
or growth of an asset base built on financial power (Chevalier, 1999). As Hollingworth
and Boyer state (1997 :19) "The issue is not to select one coordinating mechanism but to
combine both according to the nature of the objectives, the resources, and the
6characteristics of the goods"1. To find the appropriate balance, different forms of
coordination select different models of development.
2. Partnership as an element of a new development model
The new forms of economic coordination, such as cooperation and partnership, are
consistent with a new, emerging model of development; the type of governance that made
use of hierarchy and was consistent with an old model that many referred to as Fordist or
Keynesien (Aglietta, 1976; Beaud and Dostaler, 1993).
The limits to Fordism were first pointed out by the counter-cultural movements of the late
1960s, in their questioning of mass consumption, then by the labour movement of the
early 1970s, in their opposition to standardized work and the Taylorist division of labour
(W.E. Upjohn Institute, 1973). From an economic regulation perspective, stagflation
(inflation combined with high unemployment) cast doubt on Keynesian assumptions and
even the ability of the State to meet the employment challenge in economies that were
increasingly opening up to the world. At the same time, large firms involved in mass
production demonstrated that they were unable to respond rapidly to new consumer
demands or to problems of the environment. (Piore et Sabel, 1984). Stated differently, the
1980s were generally characterized by a questioning of private hierarchy, as embodied by
large firms, and by the public hierarchy of the State. Thus, General Motors (GM) and the
USSR failed miserably as a result of their institutional rigidities, which prevented them
from innovating and adapting in a context of rapid change. In sum, the dominant forms of
governance, based at that time on hierarchy, economic rationality and regulatory control,
were unable to take advantage of the potential for flexibility and integration provided by
the new information technologies and that required that economies open up to the world.
To meet the new social and economic challenges, innovative firms not only invested in
modern technology, but also experimented with new forms of governance and new forms
                                                 
1"The issue is not to select one coordinating mechanism but to combine both according to the nature of the
objectives, the resources, and the characteristics of the goods" (Boyer et Hollingworth, 1997 : 19).
7of work organisation that emphasized versatility in work tasks, work teams and worker
participation (Bélanger, Grant, Lévesque, 1994). Consumer relations became increasingly
client-oriented, with the result that in many respects the entire economy became a service
economy; from that point forward competition centered as much on quality as on price
(Gadrey, 1996). The large, hierarchical private firms were transformed, and now
promoted smaller factories and outsourcing components of their production considered
too removed from its principal activities. In the process, it became obvious that the
flexibility and integration made possible by the new information technologies could not
realize their full potential without the cooperation of the workers and sub-contractors. As
Porter (1990) has shown, the quality of the relationships that a firm maintains with its
suppliers and clients can provide a competitive edge. Lastly, the opening up of markets
pushed firms to focus on their principal activity and to embark on an unprecedented cycle
of innovation and research and development. Similarly, the State refocused on its hard-
core or principal functions, namely, regulation and redistribution, partially abandoning to
the private sector activities involving production and infrastructure management.
Experimentation in State regulation and in the control exercised by firms adopted a new
structure; it now involved the market, the State and civil society2. As such, the new
governance comprised elements from each of the three sectors, bursting the overly rigid
boundaries between the social sphere and the economic sphere. This new approach placed
the emphasis on non-market interdependence (which was not totally economic in nature);
this interdependence exists or can be created between individuals and organisations (trust,
social cohesion and proximity reduce transaction costs), between firms in the same sector
(industrial clusters and the new linking of values), between firms and their environment
(ex. innovative environments, industrial zones that promote training and collective assets)
(Julien, 1994; Streeck,1992 ; Salais and Storper, 1993).
                                                                                                                                                     
2 Civil society embodies associations, unions, the social economy, community groups, etc.
8Thus, alongside the market (competition) and hierarchy (authority), cooperation through
association, networks and partnership were virtually automatic requirements when it
came to coordinating economic activity, and as a source of value. With this objective in
mind, firms were invited to take on functions that belonged to the State and that were
until then considered exclusively as part of the public domain (Monnier et Thiry, 1997).
In a similar way, the local communities that form zones of "citizen solidarity" and the
unions that represent the collective interest of the workers become more amenable to
dialogue and partnership  because it is both in their own interest and in the general
interest.
These changes in production may be observed at the global as well as the local level.
(Piore et Sabel, 1984; Saxenian, 1994). Although globalisation is in certain respects an
ideology, it nevertheless embodies real changes that distinguish it from
internationalization. With globalisation, national boundaries no longer constitute a
significant obstacle to the movement of goods and services (Grant, 1997 :319); in
addition, globalisation is characterized by "a multiplicity of competing innovative
methods originating in various locations around the world" (Coriat, 1997 : 242).
Globalisation gives rise to tremendous competitive pressures and a great deal of
uncertainty with regard to investment. In order to reduce the uncertainties and share the
risks that prevail in this environment, the market-as-coordinating-mechanism must be
complemented by forms of collaboration that accentuate trust and the long term.  Once
this is achieved, the new forms of cooperation reduce competition and transaction costs to
a lesser degree than those stemming from innovation and adaptation (Hage et Alter,
1997). In contrast to cartels that focus on prices and quantity, the new forms of agreement
provide ways to open up new markets, develop new products and facilitate access to new
technologies; they represent a new stage in organizational forms, that is, a new way of
thinking about inter-firm relations and the relevance of economic behaviour, including
agreements with universities, associations and unions. This openness proves all the more
necessary as the economy becomes knowledge based (Rosell, 1999).
9We thus see that this system of governance is generally much more complex than
hierarchical coordination since the various parties remain independent and there is wider
involvement in the decision-making process (Hage and Alter, 1997 :96). Forms that
emphasize cooperation also differ from coordination by the market since they activate
decision makers, thereby drawing on a "visible hand", to use an expression employed by
Alfred Chandler (1977). Thus, in the partnership type of governance, suppliers are more
likely to be chosen as a result of a selection process than on the basis of requests for
proposals. After this process, the parties must negotiate the conditions of their
collaboration and invest in group training. Seen in this way, the "new partnership is a
social procedure of building and sharing in long-term relationships [implying the]
establishment of routines and multiple procedures [that] have bonded agents together
with forms of coordination and arbitration that are essentially non-commercial" (Coriat,
1997 : 259). As a result, governance that emphasizes partnership and cooperation relies
increasingly on "a model for interaction that places greater emphasis on factors outside
the firm, particularly interaction, training, and the sharing of knowledge and social and
institutional infrastructure" (Landry et al, 1999 : 7). In this context, the State tends to play
the role of catalyst and broker, promoting agreements among economic and non-
economic partners, especially when it comes to conquering external markets.
Paradoxically, the local sphere, too, lends itself increasingly to new forms of
collaboration between firms and economically relevant social forces, such as universities,
unions and citizen groups. The mobilization of local actors is two-pronged. First, there
are local initiatives that deal with problems that large firms and the State cannot resolve,
such as the conversion of certain industrial zones consisting of older industries (Klein and
Lévesque, 2000). Second, there are innovative environments and new industrial zones
that mobilise local forces to conquer external markets (Piore et Sabel, 1984). In this way,
so-called "smart communities" come into being; their aim is to insert cities or towns into
the knowledge-based economy. These communities consist of "geographical zones,
ranging in size from a few adjacent communities to several municipalities; their residents,
organisations and governing  institutions benefit by employing information technologies
and work in partnership to improve their situation". Here, "cooperation among governing
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institutions, industries, educators and citizens is preferable to isolated initiatives. The
technological changes introduced by the smart communities are comprehensive rather
than incremental". (Smart Communities Guidebook, 1997, cited by Landry et al, 1999 :
52).
Lastly, the upgrading of the local sphere and local forces is consistent with a system of
production and firms that stresses flexibility and integration, rapid response to demand
organisational culture, zero stock,  just-in-time methods, etc. As Hollingworth and Boyer
put it (1997 : 27): "Cooperation among competing producers, a minimum of conflict
between employers and their employees, and long-term stable relations with suppliers
and customers are prerequisites to the survival of flexible production systems". In sum,
the proximity of suppliers, the involvement of workers and the differentiation of products
by quality, now prompts firms, more than ever, to take into account the specific
characteristics of the local sphere. This new vision of the local sphere is accompanied by
a re-assessment not only of the relationship between what is economic and what is social,
but also of their respective content. Thus, by using proximity-based relations, the
upgraded local sphere mobilises social resources. From that point on, it is not enough to
simply couple science and the market; firms must also dovetail with the actors in each
milieu by creating networks for collaboration and exchange of knowledge that involve
clients, suppliers, consultants, government agencies, university-based researchers,
researchers in government laboratories, etc. (Landry et al,1999 : 21)
In sum, the market and other coordinating mechanisms are influenced by social
production systems, including the system of industrial relations; training systems; the
internal structures of firms; the relations between firms and their suppliers and clients; the
importance of publicly owned companies and the social economy relative to the private
sector, conceptions of justice and equity involving labour and capital; and customs and
national traditions, etc. Forms of governance vary considerably; they depend on the
society, and may even vary within a society (by form of local production, for example). A
complex system of institutions influences the forms of cooperation; in the United States,
networks of universities and private firms are the predominant form; in Germany, firms,
11
associations and the State collaborate in the area of professional and technical training;
Italy, particularly the "Third Italy" has its industrial zones (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Benko
and Lipietz, 2000).
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CONCLUSION 
Issues and challenges for publicly owned companies and the social economy
Partnerships, which play a central role in the new forms of governance, are important to
firms that wish to capture world markets; many local development initiatives also use
them. This is both good and bad news for publicly owned firms and enterprises of the
social economy. I do not wish to pass Soloman's judgement on partnerships, but I believe
that they pose a threat as well as provide opportunities.
1) They are a threat to the extent that, compared to publicly owned companies and to the
social economy, private firms seem to enjoy greater flexibility and mobility. The
result is that they find it easier to establish their market position, especially outside
their home country, and to exercise greater autonomy in their choice of partners.
When private firms seek to capture foreign markets and develop partnerships with
other firms, one of which is a national publicly owned firm, this makes the home
company seem more relevant in the public eye. There is therefore a danger that the
State will limit its role almost exclusively to that of broker for projects of private
firms, without raising questions about the content of the development project itself. In
addition, some southern nations criticize publicly owned companies of northern
nations for acting as agents of privatisation (created through partnerships in the
country of origin). The danger is even greater, given that globalisation was not
accompanied by the development of appropriate mechanisms for governance at the
supra-national level, at least not within the framework of NAFTA; in addition,
publicly owned companies and the social economy received hardly recognition at this
level (Grant, 1997 : 319). Lastly, a multinational firm that does not establish real roots
in a country where it is conducting business (the stateless firm) constitutes an
approach that is entirely alien to publicly owned firms and to the social economy.
The fact that enterprises of the social economy have greater difficulty forming
partnerships with publicly owned firms than with private firms, threatens the future of
the social economy. Partnerships with private firms force enterprises that are supposed
13
to act in the general and collective interest to apply standards of profitability
employed by the private sector. This is all the more threatening since the coordination
methods of the partnership remain ambiguous, given that they fail to put a halt to
competition, conflict and opportunistic behaviour. Unless it arises in a favourable
institutional context and allows for serious negotiation between the parties, the
partnership will probably result in paternalism or become a phony partnership; this is
all the more likely when large capitalist firms - and sometimes even large firms that
are publicly owned or that form part of the social economy -form partnerships with
small enterprises of the social economy (Kernaghan, 1993 : 65). The dangers are all
the more ominous when they involve social development in which the State is the
principal partner of small enterprises or of organizations that belong to the social
economy (Lamoureux, 1994 : 186).
Thus, to achieve real partnership it is absolutely necessary to recognize that all parties
have useful expertise and resources, and that through negotiation there is the
possibility for collaboration. If the partnership cannot flourish without agreements and
compromises among parties with divergent interests, then it will have to resort to an
institutional framework to accommodate the differing viewpoints and determine what
conditions are necessary to carry out a joint project successfully. Once these
requirements are met, the partnership will be in a position to create a sort of intangible
capital, a company capital consisting of knowledge (Deloncourt, 1993), networks
(Putnam, 1993) and the ability to cooperate (Coleman, 1990).
2) In addition, and as I have attempted to demonstrate throughout this presentation, the
types of governance based on partnership offer a wide array of opportunities, both
locally and globally. Due to their legal status and their objective of acting in the
general and collective interest, publicly owned firms and enterprises of the social
economy would, for the purposes of partnership and cooperation, provide a more
solid foundation than private firms. In the field of cooperation, including development
cooperation, there is a long tradition of inter-cooperation, both at the national and
international levels. Although these partnerships are generally sector-based, the
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rediscovery of the local sphere gave rise to numerous inter-sectoral initiatives for
cooperation and partnership; we will, no doubt, have the opportunity to hear about
these in the various workshops of this congress.
Partnership could also open up the public economy and the social economy, and
extend their influence so as to generate a "new mixed economy", to use an expression
employed by Anthony Giddens (1998 : 69). This new mixed economy would be
different form the one that emerged in the 1950s inasmuch as it would manifest itself
more as a plural economy than as an economy of relatively self-sufficient
megaprojects. In the new mixed economy, firms in the public economy and
enterprises of the social economy would have the ability to "contaminate" private
firms, so to speak, by making them support objectives that promoted the general
interest; these objectives would be based on mechanisms that were relatively binding,
such as shareholder agreements.
Lastly, in the new forms of governance, partnerships can mobilise social forces that
are growing and diversifying. For example, the participation of unions might be based
on the working venture funds and pension funds that they control; community groups
(or associations) would participate within the framework of local development
projects and universities would get involved on the basis of their expertise with the
new economy. These new partners gravitate almost naturally toward a collective
interest that is open to the general interest.  Moreover, in situations of conflict,
participants from civil society prefer discussion and negotiation (that is, having a
voice) to "dropping out" (Neuville,1997 :301). As a result, in more favorable
conditions, partnerships could help democratize the economy.
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